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IV

STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter under the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(j) and pursuant to the Order of the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah issued October 13,1999, transferring this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals
for disposition .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(Including standard of appellate review and supporting authority)
Issue I.

Whether the District Court properly excluded parole evidence

concerning the intended "security" character of a certain real property conveyance, where
the conveyance instrument was silent with respect to its "security" character,
notwithstanding Defendant's pre-trial proffer of evidence showing said intention of the
parties to said instrument.
This issue was raised by Plaintiffs' pre-trial Motion in Limine dated January 12,1999
(R. 263-277), which motion was opposed by Defendant in the hearing held on January 19,
1999 (R. 226-227) and was initially determined adversely to Defendant by the Court in a
telephone conference held on January 22, 1999. The issue was again raised at trial
byDefendant (T. 137-139, 235) and again determined adversely to Smedley (T. 236).
Standard of Review:

The issue of whether evidence is admissible is a question

of law, where [the appellate Court] reviews for correctness, incorporating a "clearly

1

erroneous' standard of review for subsidiary factual determination." Cal Wadsworth
Construction v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1398 (Utah 1995).

Issue II.

Whether the District Court properly disregarded all of the uncontested

testimony concerning the substance, intent and value of Defendant's substitute payment
performances under the Agreement in making its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
In other words, was there sufficient evidence to support the Court's Findings concerning
Defendant's substitute payment performances?
This issue was raised in Plaintiffs' Objections to plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. (R. 312-332,ffif7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19,21 and 22).
Standard of Review:

The Supreme Court reviews the Trial Court's Findings

of Fact for clear error and its legal conclusions for correctness." Smith v. Batchelor, 934
P.2d 643 (Utah 1997).
Issue III.

Whether the District Court properly disregarded • all uncontested

testimony concerning Defendant's loss suffered by the unauthorized sale of 24.75 acres of
the Salmon Property. In other words, was there sufficient evidence to support the Court's
Findings concerning Defendant's loss of value?
This issue was raised in Plaintiffs' Objections to plaintiffs' Proposed Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. (R. 312-332, \ 23).
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Standard of Review: The Supreme Court reviews the Trail Court's Findings of Fact
for clear error and its legal conclusions for correctness." Smith v. Batchelor, 934 P.2d 643
(Utah 1997).
Issue IV.

Whether the District Court properly received negative reputational

evidence concerning Defendant when the subject matter of such evidence was not an
element of any claim asserted by Plaintiffs.
This issue was raised by Defendant's pre-trial Motion in Limine dated January 14,
1999 (R. 278-282), which motion was opposed by Plaintiffs in the hearing held on January
19, 1999 (R. 226-227) and was initially determined adversely to Defendant by the Court in
a telephone conference held on January 22, 1999. The issue was again raised at trial by
Defendant and again determined adversely to Defendant. (T. 271, 276-277).
Standard of Review: The issue of whether evidence is admissible is a question of
law, where [the appellate Court] reviews for correctness, incorporating a "clearly erroneous'
standard of review for subsidiary factual determination." Cal Wadsworth Construction v.
City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1398 (Utah 1995).
STATUTES AND RULES, THE INTERPRETATION OF WHICH IS OF
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Rule 404(a), Utah Rules of Evidence:
(a)

Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
3

(1) Character ofaccused. Evidence of a pertinent
trait of character offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent
trait of character of the victim of the crime offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of a character trait of
peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence
that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the
character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607,
608 and 609.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In late 1978, Defendant Dale T. Smedley ("Smedley") and Mel and Kathy Glauser
(collectively "Glausers") entered into a oral agreement whereby Glausers would convey to
Smedley certain real property known as Melanie Acres, in consideration for which Smedley
would provide to Glausers the following consideration: (1)

payment of $2,000 per month

to be generated by rent from a storage facility in Davis County (the "Davis County
Property") for the remainder of Glausers individual lives; (2) payment of $6,000 per year for
vacation expenses for Glausers for at least thirteen years;

(3) management of the Davis

County Property, including maintenance, payment of taxes and collection of rents; (4)
conveyance of title to the Davis County Property to Glausers as security only for the above
payment obligations; and (5) establishment of an escrow account in the amount of
$300,000.00 (the "Escrow Account") to secure the Smedley's payment obligations and the
payment of a mortgage obligation then securing the Davis County Property. (T. 135-136).

4

On January 29,1979, a written Agreement prepared by Glausers' attorney, describing
some, but not all of the terms of the oral agreement, was executed by the Glausers and
Smedley, at or about the same time that Melanie Acres was conveyed by deed to Smedley,
and the Davis County Property was conveyed by deed to Glausers. (T. 140-141) The
written Agreement omitted reference to the parties' oral agreement that the conveyance of
the Davis County Property to the Glausers would be reversed upon the death of the survivor
of the Glausers if the payment obligations had been fulfilled. (Trial Exhibit 1)
By December 4,1979, Glausers and Smedley had orally amended their agreement to
allow Smedley to substitute certain real property in Salmon, Idaho (the "Salmon Property")
for the Escrow Account, to secure Smedley's payment obligations under the agreement. At
that time, Smedley conveyed a mortgage on the Salmon Property to Glausers. (T. 145-146;
Trial Exhibit 4) On March 13,1980, Smedley supplemented the mortgage with a Warranty
Deed, conveying legal title to the Salmon Property to Glausers as security only for full
performance of Smedley's payment obligations under the agreement. (T. 146-147; Trial
Exhibit 5)
On July 19, 1993, Glausers conveyed 24.75 acres of the Salmon Property to Billey
Isley, an unrelated third-party, by Quit Claim Deed without Smedley's consent and without
payment of any consideration therefore to Smedley. (T. 68-69; Trial Exhibit 12)
During the term of the agreement, Smedley fulfilled some, but not all, of his payment
obligations as they were literally set forth in the Agreement. (R. 176-185) Pursuant to
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various oral agreements and arrangements made between Glausers and Smedley, Smedley
conveyed other parcels of real property (T. 163-166; Trial Exhibits 19 and 34) to, and
performed construction labor and material (T. 156-158; Trial Exhibits 36, 37, 38) for,
Glausers in substitute performance for the portions of the payment obligations under the
Agreement which he had not satisfied.
In the summer of 1994, both Glausers died, and Smedley demanded that Plaintiffs
(the heirs of Glausers) reconvey to Smedley the titles to the Davis County Property and the
Salmon Property. When Plaintiffs refused to reconvey the Properties, Smedley recorded
"Notices of Interest" with the appropriate recorders' offices, encumbering title to both
Properties.
In June 1996, Plaintiffs brought this action to remove the encumbrances and to
recover a money judgment against Smedley for the non-payment of some of the obligations
in the Agreement. (R. 1) Smedley filed a Counterclaim, seeking reconveyance of the Davis
County Property and the Salmon Property, and acknowledgment of the full consideration
he had paid to Glausers. (R. 93)
Pursuant to pre-trial Motions in Limine, the Court (1) refused to allow Smedley to
introduce any evidence at trial concerning the "security" nature of the Davis County Property
conveyance and (2) allowed Plaintiffs to introduce evidence concerning Smedley's general
reputation in the community for truthfulness and voracity .

; C l i v i i 11 ii^; n * b i i t i v i i ) C l u l L J u d L X A i f L i u i v . -

• :}.M.iii wli J a n u a r y

]•'

intent and value of Smedley's substitute payment performances, notwithstanding the fact
that the evidence presented by Smedley was uncontested, and (2) the value of the Salmon
Property lost to Sin ledle y by > \ a;; > : f Glausei s' coi i ^ e;; • anc e : f tl le 2 1 / 5 aci es,
i lotw ill istandii ig the Coi ill's finding that the Salmon Property belonged to Smedley.
(findings are attached hereto as Addendu i ,n~, ~ Igment was entered in favor of Plaintiffs
nnd ncrainst Smcdlev on the breach

/contract and quid uiic u> D A \ \ , t oa. ;- - , r orerty

Salmon Piopcri}, iiudiiK, liiai conveyance lo A .a,c jcen made toi >ccunt) puipu^es.
(Findings 31-35: R. 422-423)

• • •• • lat the District Court recognize ( l ) S m e d l e y ' s entire agreement with Smedley,
;VJ; UK security character of the Davis Count) Property conveyance, (3) the \ ah le of
Smedley's substitute performances m.w^i Uu Agreement, and ( I ) tl le loss of v all ic to the
Sail i ion Propei I:; 7 cai lsed 1:>; • Glai lsers pai tial coi \\ • e;; • ai ice tl lereof.

STATEMENT OF MATERIA I, VM " I'S

i Ill 3i ig w orkii ig relationship of almost 30 \ r a r s , oi le with another, concerning the
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development and/or construction of various real estate projects. (T. 132-133) Virtually all
of the projects in which Smedley and Mel D. Glauser worked together were circumscribed
and governed by oral agreements and non-written understandings. A regular course of
business was established between Smedley and Melvin D. Glauser which did not include
formalization of their cooperative efforts into written documentation. (T. 177-178)
In 1978, Smedley and Melvin D. Glauser entered into an oral agreement whereby
Smedley would purchase from Glausers certain real property located in Davis County,
known as Melanie Acres Subdivision (hereinafter "Melanie Acres"). (T. 136-137) Melanie
Acres, reasonably valued at that time at approximately $165,000.00 was conveyed to
Smedley, free and clear of any liens or encumbrances. (T. 134-135) Glausers determined
that rather than real estate, they desired an long-term regular income stream as consideration
from Smedley for the conveyance of the Davis County Property, which constituted 86 rental
storage units. The income stream agreed upon by and between Smedley and Glausers vvas
anticipated to be sufficient to produce a regular monthly payment of $2,000.00 plus an
annual vacation account of $6,000.00. In order to produce such an income stream, Smedley
and Glausers agreed that Smedley would dedicate the Davis County Property to Glausers for
the remainder of the life of the last survivor of the Glausers. (T. 136-140)
As of January 29, 1979, the unencumbered value of the Davis County Property was
fairly equal to that of Melanie Acres; however, there was a mortgage lien on the property
which was equal to its full value. In order to secure Smedley's obligations to provide the
8

promised income stream, Smedley agreed to i indei take the folio vv i n g o b l i g a t i o n
:! i ' •*

*

%

Glauses

-\ \

*. .»*i\ j-y

' *.

\ •

of the Davis County Property; (3) pay and timely satisfy" the lien mortgage against the Davis
County Property; (4) pay all real estate taxes assessed against the Davis County Property;
create the Esci o vv i Vccoiii it

- . ..

*

.m ^

: .e

would pay the annual sum of $6,000. ( I .136-137)
r

('

-; onsideration of SmedlcVs eoxenants under the agreement. Giausers agreed that

vhen the mortgage lien agamsi .... . . .
• • ei ICI in ibrai ice, Glai lsei s*

•

; .
'•

pv i\ was pan. ... . J . , ...,. emoved
•

.: ' .. r.*u \.

n

the last survivor of the Giausers died, if Snicdlc) had discharged all ol hi!* pa\ meiit
i 1 ,# liions, the Davis County Property would be reconveyed to Smedle>

'T

1

" ° • '")

Tn connection wi;i,. . :;al agreement, u-kiusers preparer .. ^i uicn Agreement uaied
,. .

., - -

d

which was signed by Smedley and Glauser Construction. (Irial Exhibit I) hi accordance
with the oral agreement and the Agreement, Giausers conveyed Melanie Acres to Smedley,

29 19 79 ( I i ialE xhibit 2)
Later in 1979, Smedley and Giausers amended their agreement by substituting the
274 acre Salmon Property as security for Smedley's payment of the mortgage lien on the
9

Davis County Property, instead of the Escrow Account. (T. 145; Trial Exhibit 4) On or
about March 30, 1980 Smedley and his wife conveyed title to the Salmon Property as
substitute security for Smedley's obligations. (Trial Exhibit 5) In connection with the
conveyance of the Salmon Property and identical to their arrangement concerning the Escrow
Account, Smedley and Glausers agreed that upon Smedley's satisfaction of the mortgage lien
on the Davis County Property, the Salmon Property would be reconveyed to Smedley free
and clear of all liens and encumbrances which were not encumbering the Salmon Property
as of March 30, 1980. (T. 147-150) As part of the amendment to the agreement, Smedley
agreed to pay all property taxes assessed against the Salmon property.
In 1984, Smedley suffered a heart attack and became temporarily disabled. (T. 175)
Between 1984 and 1988, because of his physical disability, Smedley became delinquent in
some of the payment obligations under the agreement.
Beginning in 1988, Smedley undertook to cure the defaults in tax and vacation
payments of the prior four years by providing materials and services, without charge, for and
at the request of Glausers. In 1988, Smedley provided to Glausers certain construction and
development improvements to Lakeview Gardens No.4, a 13-lot subdivision (the Lakeview
Project") and four lots in Heritage Square No.3 (the "Heritage Project"), both properties
owned by Glausers. (T. 156-159) The fair value of Smedley's services and materials on the
Projects totalled $94,626.53. (Trial Exhibits 36, 37, 38)

10

F o r t h . i„u:.w vicscriDcu *CL\I^;-

uua nuieii^iS Glausers agreed to cred; (r

J-

four years of unfunded vacation account. Glausers agreed to retain the remaining $56,140.29
as credit to be applied to past and future taxes due on the Salmon Property and the future
vacathi, unuiiU. •

I

both the Salmon property and the Davis County property, Smedley conveyed to Glausers
three unimproved lots: Smedley Estates Lots 8 and 10 in Salmon. Idaho ^onve\ ed on \ p d l
*_. ^ndk ...uniw o o d l Ji lit#3 I -ot309 ii il .ay toi l, I Itah, conveyed -, :. i;ecemDei

-,y-S.

1
On June 19, 1993, Glausers conveyed to Isley, approximately 24 acres of the Salmon
property valued by I ,emhi County at $1,800 per acre, without the consent or approval of
Smedley. SLULJICV received no c o n s u l .ilk
coi isideratic-'

_

ictic

ru«.* . »nv proceeds pai*< . > .
•'

••

.n

•.•

In the summer of 1994, Glausers both died, having received ail of their bargained
consideration under the agreement, including $2,000.00 per month for their lives from 1979
11 in 1 ill Itie ikalli ill llieiir liisl Mii'nn i on Al I In. lime oil llitm dc.iLli. Siiiedln It.id tiillillul .ill i>f
his obligations and co /enai its \ n ider the agreement and \

• 4 *'

both the Davis County Property and the Salmon Property. ( 1 . 166-lb?)

ll

i

Following Glausers' deaths, Smedley, orally and in writing, requested that Plaintiffs
reconvey the Properties. (Trial Exhibits 14 and 15) Plaintiffs refused to reconvey the
Properties and, on June 6, 1996, instituted this civil action against Smedley and his family.
(R. 1)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District court erroneously ruled prior to the commencement of the bench trial
herein, that Smedley would be unable to introduce any evidence which would vary, alter or
supplement the terms of the written Agreement dated January 29, 1979, concerning the
conveyance of the Davis County Property by Smedley to Glausers. That ruling was again
reaffirmed during the Trial when Smedley attempted to introduce testimony concerning the
security nature of the Davis County Property conveyance. The District Court's error was
in its failure to comply with the mandate of Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 110
(Utah 1991) which requires that a trial court consider eight separate elements when
determining whether an absolute deed was intended to be a mortgage notwithstanding the
general prohibitions of the parol evidence rule . A careful analysis of the proferred facts of
this matter clearly demonstrate that it was the intent of both parties that the conveyance by
warranty deed of the Davis County Property was accompanied with an oral understanding
that Glausers would hold the deed only as security and reconvey it to Smedley once
Smedley's payment obligations were satisfied.
12

' I he Court 's second error was foiling to consider the unrebutted testimony presented

Glauser, fully satisfying previous payment defaults of Smedley in his property tax and
vacation funding obligations. There was no contradictory evidence offered to the absolute
nature ,?; me conveyances of three separate ui limproved lot - .
Mi.-

.; Glauser. Neither was

•

d

materials valued in excess of $94,000 without reimbursement. Testimony was offered even
from the Plaintiffs" themselves to the fact that at least a portion of the substitute payments
wereiiuei^wv,., .... .^ been used to saiisiy prior tax payment default >. ;:,i \ ^ .

• ; mdings

substitute performance.
Similarly, notwithstanding the uncontradicted evidence that as naked fee holders of
tiic >>aimo;. n...,.:;. •

sers made an unauthorized conveyance of 24 acres of that property

I ,i llimi p.irl', A', A rnistn" p»| ih-• "V'lMiil.iiit"1 tnr,l a<\'ttni I", Ihe so \\\\\\ cuiivt'sam ." nf
the Salmon Property, Glausers had a duty to reconvey the entire Salmon Property at such
time as Smedley fulfilled his payment obligations. After the death of the Glausers, Plaintiffs
as si lccessor tin istees, w ere responsible for that reconveyance. However, in as much as 24

impossible. Smedley should be awarded damages or credited for the value of the 24 acres.

The District Court's final prejudicial error was in allowing prejudicial testimony as
to Smedley's general reputation for truthfulness and veracity in direct violation of Rule
404(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. None of the claims asserted by Glausers included in
their elements the issue of Smedley's general honesty or veracity. Inasmuch as those
qualities were not directly an issue, Smedley's reputation for truthfulness was irrelevant and
should have been excluded.
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court erred in excluding all parol evidence concerning the security
nature of the Davis County Property Conveyance.

The heart of Smedley's defense to Plaintiffs' Complaint and basis for his
Counterclaim are the factual circumstances surrounding the creation of the original
agreement between Glausers and Smedley, which agreement predated the execution of the
written Agreement, clarifies an omitted term of the writing, and clearly establishes the intent
of the parties to limit the conveyance of the Davis County) Property to one for security
purposes only.
On January 12, 1999, two weeks prior to the trial of this matter, Plaintiffs filed a
Motion in Limine seeking to prevent Smedley from introducing any "parol evidence of
alleged oral agreements seeking to contradict or vary the terms of the 1979 Agreement and
Warranty Deed conveying to Glauser the Davis County Property." (R. 264). In the Motion
Plaintiffs acknowledge that throughout these proceedings Smedley had consistently asserted
14

tl iattl lepai ties 1 mdagi eedtl lattl leDa v is County Proper ty would be reconveyed to Smedley
at the death of the survivor of the Glai ise rs I low • = \ ei , becai ise tl le w i itt 21 i \ gi ee n i.c i it and
the Warranty D e e d conveying the Davis County Property m a k e no mention oi a iwVvision,
Plaintiffs sought to prevent evidence of the contracting parties' actual intention - \ bearing
i,
outlined tl

- .

Judge iillphin

A a; . ,,.^n nme counsel : i; *; j u t k y
;

^

T

n:,

informed counsel by telephone that he would not allow any such testimony.

During the trial, Plaintiffs independently raised the issue of the actual intentions of the
<

v. :,_ . ; i ! : r a . i \ r L \ h : .

. . .:v. Ai.non^ropL^

*. LIIK-LLII the testimony of William

l

LH

i

agreement of between himself and Mel concerning the eventual reversion of title to Smedley,
Plaintiffs objected. The Court ultim.at.ely refused any such testimony. (T. 13 7-139,226-227).
- , :
to this

. . .:eaimeiii . .* ,*^w as a mortgage is not novel

' '

•

so intended " .scobson v. Jacobson,

-J.'

557 P.2d 156, 158 (Ltaii 197b). "In e q r r .

i u<~cd,

absolute on. its face, may b e shown. by parol evidence lo have been given for. security
purposes o n h . and ill sue h si ion )ittu lie made, equily w ill effect to the intention of the parties."
fQar

v_

Brimley,

4 9 / 'x '

J

^
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' -! * n~"*

h e q u e n l h execute absolute

deeds of conveyance to creditors with merely an oral understanding that the creditor will hold

the deed only as security and reconvey it to the debtor once the obligation is satisfied.
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 110 (Utah 1991).
The Utah State Supreme Court has adopted a list of "elements a court must consider
when determining whether an absolute deed was intended as a mortgage." Winegar, id.
That list, first announced in Brown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292,297 (Utah 1984), includes the
following:
1) whether there was a continuing obligation on the part of the grantor to pay a debt
or meet an obligation the deed allegedly was made to secure, (2) the question of
relative values, (3) contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties, (4) the
parties' statements, (5) the form of the written evidence of the transactions, (6) the
nature of the testimony on which the parties rely, (7) the relationship between the
parties, and (8) the apparent aims and purposes of the transfer.
813P.2ndatllO.
In the pre-trial hearing and again during closing argument (T. 293-299), Smedley
attempted to convince the Court that an analysis of the facts of this matter would clearly
demonstrate that the obvious intentions of Smedley and Glausers in consummating the 1979
conveyance of the Davis County Property to Glausers was to secure Smedley's payment
obligations.
First, there was a substantial continuing obligation required of Smedley to Glausers
which extended long after the date of the conveyance of the Davis County Property.
Glausers admit that Smedley was required to pay $2,000 per month, $6,000 per year for
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vacations, pay taxes and maintenance on bi ;.. * u*. ,. .iM-\ ana >>aimon Properties. (R. 1 ) 6 181)

Agreement to be given by Smedley to Giausers shows a margin of over three to one in favor
of the Giausers. In return for the receipt of the undeveloped Melanie Acres, valued at
approximate^ $165. 000, Smedley paid the follow ing:
^ not

.i )

$360,000 "

Vacation Payments ($6,000 x 9 years)
naxisPonnts Properl;

165.000
• S • l-

lUiAi. LUNMDhKAliON:
- *"•

'

54,000

)c:n ' e \ v ere disclosed to tl le i

»
= pi e trial hearing

and were also submitted in chart form during closing argument. {Y. 295-296; Addendum II
attached hereto)
,;

. ,;.;ic>, L,;..K action regarding ., .

. . < :*ipcrt\ i..Mi.:-\ing the

iiuii: paid properly taxes. Miiedle) mainiained and made certain improvements on the
Property.

one, which would be reversed after the payment of a lifetime income stream. Smedley had

~7

told many people of the security nature of the conveyance, including his sons. The Court
refused to allow Smedley's sons to so testify.
Fifth, the form of the conveyance is absolute. The warranty deed purports to convey
full title to the Davis County Property. The concurrently executed Agreement similarly is
silent concerning any reversionary right. Smedley, however, was prepared to testify his
understanding of the language of paragraph 3 of the Agreement, to mean that upon the death
of the last surviving Glauser, the entire relationship concerning the Davis County Property
would be terminated and all rights of Smedley restored to said Property.
Sixth, the nature of the non-hearsay testimony relied upon by Smedley is limited to
himself because both Mel and Kathy Glauser have since deceased. Both parties would be
able to introduce a large amount of admissible evidence, which would not be hearsay as
admissions against the interest of the other respective parties. Rule 801, Utah Rules of
Evidence.
Seventh, the offered testimony was unanimous that the Glasuers and the Smedleys
were social friends as well as business associates. (T. 133) They had vacationed together,
jointly developed real estate projects and even employed each other's children. This was not
a cold commercial relationship.
Eighth, the sole and uncontroverted testimony concerning the original aim and
purpose of the transaction was to allow Smedley to obtain Melanie Acres for his personal
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development purposes in return for a lifetime income stream plus the opportunity to fund
annual joint family vacations. Those aims were fully realized.
Each of the above items should have been proper subjects for the submission of
evidence at trial. But because of the Court's pre-trial ruling, and its mid-trial sustaining of
Plaintiffs' objection to Smedley's attempt to introduce testimony to those issues, Smedley
was wrongly denied his opportunity to attempt to meet the "clear and convincing" burden
required for his equitable claim. Winegar, at 110.

II.

The District Court erred in disregarding all uncontested testimony concerning
the substance, intent and value of Smedley's substitute payment performances
under the Agreement.
At trial, Smedley introduced evidence in various forms concerning the following facts:
(1)

As substitute payment for his defaulted obligations, Glauser accepted from

Smedley two lots in Smedley Estates Subdivision, and a Cottonwood lot;
(2)

As additional substitute payment for his defaulted obligations, Glauser

requested and accepted from Smedley work and material furnished by Smedley for the
development of two of Glausers' projects, the Heritage Project and Lakeview Project;
(3)

The three lots conveyed as substitute payment were fairly valued by both

Glausers and Smedley at approximately $12,500 each; and
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(4)

The total value of the work and materials provided for the Heritage and

Lakeview Projects, and for which no compensation was ever received by Smedley was in
excess of $94,000.00. (Trial Exhibit 37)
Notwithstanding Smedley's submission of unrebutted credible evidence as to each of the
foregoing points, the District Court failed to issue any Findings of Fact recognizing the
existence and value of the substitute consideration provided by Smedley, fully discharging
his obligations to Glausers secured by the Davis County and Salmon Properties.
In attacking the Findings of Fact, the related Conclusions of Law, and the provisions
of the Judgment based on those Findings, Smedley is burdened with the duty of marshaling
all of the evidence supporting and opposing the targeted Findings. A.K. & R. Whipple
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518, 524-525 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999).
Smedley also acknowledges his burden to shown that the attacked Findings are "clearly
erroneous."

Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999). However, a trial court's

findings of fact will be deemed clearly erroneous and set aside if they are so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Id. Accordingly each of the above
issues will be hereafter treated separately.
A.

Glausers' Acceptance of Three Lots as Substitute Performance.

The three Lots were deeded absolutely to Glausers. (Trial Exhibits 19 and 34) The
lots were listed by Glauser on a memo given to his attorney for estate planning purposes. (T.
25-26, Trial Exhibit 6). Plaintiff, Steve Glauser, admitted that Lots 8 and 10 of Smedley
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Estates were conveyed to Glausers "because Dale had not performed on some of his
obligations." (T. 55). Smedley testified that Cottonwood Lot 309 and Lots 8 and 10 of
Smedley Estates were conveyed to Glausers as credit for prior unpaid taxes. (T. 163-165).
No contrary evidence was offered. Specifically, no evidence was offered to support Finding
No. 42, that the conveyances of the three lots was made only to secure Smedley's payment
obligations (R. 426).
B.

Glausers' Acceptance of Work and Materials for Heritage and Lakeview
Projects as Substitute Performance.

Steve Glauser acknowledged that Smedley had provided work and materials for his
father's Heritage Project and Lakeview Project. (T. 42-43, 60-62) In reviewing Smedley's
list of tasks required of Smedley in each Project, (Trial Exhibits 36,37), Steve Glauser stated
that "it looks like that would be what would . . . what it would take to do that, yes." (T. 62)
Steve also testified that he had assumed his father had paid for the work, but had never seen
any paper work on the issue. (T. 42) Rick Glauser testified of knowing nothing about
Smedley's work on the Projects. (T. 112) Smedley testified concerning the work lists
prepared upon completion of each Project. (T. 156-158; Trial Exhibits 36, 37)
Question:
Answer:
Question:
Answer:
Question:
Answer:
Question:

Did he [Mel Glauser] ask you to do it?
Yes.
Did he tell you he would pay for it?
Well, by agreement we was doing it in exchange for other things we
were doing on taxes.
On taxes?
Yes.
What taxes?
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Answer:
Question:
Answer:

On the Storage Sheds.
That you hadn't paid?
That's right.

(T. 158). No other testimony was offered concerning the performance of work by Smedley
on Glauser's Projects as substitute payment.
C.

Fair Value of the Three lots.

Glauser submitted a list of his assets to his attorney, William Critchlow, for Mr.
Critchlow's use in Glauser's estate planning. (T. 11) That list includes Lots 8 and 10 of
Smedley Estates at a total value of $5,000 and Lot 309 Cottonwood #3 at a value of $ 18,000.
(Trial Exhibit 6). Smedley testified that he and Mel Glauser agreed that Smedley could
repurchase the Cottonwood Lot for $12,500. (T. 164). Similarly, Smedley testified that the
two Smedley Estate Lots were worth $12,500 each, based upon his sale of nearby virtually
identical lots in that Subdivision. (T. 166) Although Steve Glauser admited knowledge of
the conveyance of the Smedley Estate lots, he said he didn't "have a clue" about their value.
(T. 56). Billey Isley testified that he thought the Smedley Estate Lots were of little value.
(T. 76). No other evidence was offered concerning the value of the Lots.
D.

Fair Value of the Work and Materials for Heritage and Lakeview Projects.

The only direct testimony concerning the value of the work performed on the Projects
by Smedley was related to the list of work performed on Smedley's accountings (Trial
Exhibits 36 and 37). Smedley testified that the total work and materials for both Projects
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amounted to $124,953.24 from which he deducted repayment to Glausers of cash advances
of $29,983.17 for a total credit of $94,970.07. (T. 159-162; Trial Exhibit 37)
Without any evidence opposing Smedley's testimony, the District Court should have
found that the conveyance of the Lots and provision of work and materials to Glauser were
substitute payment for between $117,000 and $131,500 of obligations otherwise owing to
Glauser. In as much as the Court found only $71,701.24 principal owing. Smedley was
entitled to at least $40,000 more than the defaulted payment obligations by way of the
substitute performance. (R. 43, ^j 56)
III.

The District Court erred in ignoring all uncontested testimony concerning
Smedley's loss suffered by Glausers' unauthorized sale of 24.75 acres of the
Salmon Property.
Pursuant to the uncontroverted testimony offered by every witness with personal

knowledge of the matter, the Court found that the 1980 Warranty Deed conveyance of the
Salmon Property by Smedley to Glausers was for security purposes only and that said
conveyance should be treated as a mortgage securing Smedley's obligations under the
Agreement. (Judgment ^|8, R. 446). Notwithstanding the fact that Glausers held title to the
Salmon Property only as security, on June 19,1993, Glausers conveyed approximately 24.75
acres of the Salmon Property to Billy Isley, by Quit Claim Deed. (T. 68-69; Trial Exhibit
12). No consent was obtained or notice given to Smedley of said conveyance. Other than
an oral commitment by Mr. Isley to release an agricultural encumbrance from the remainder
of the Salmon Property, no consideration was ever paid to Glausers for the 24 acres. (T.6823

69, 85-86). Even that consideration is questionable in light of the fact that no written
instrument exits memorializing said promise and that over eight year has passed and the
encumbrance still remains of record. (T. 90). Of more important significance is the fact that
no consideration whatsoever was given to Smedley by either Glausers or Mr. Isley for the
loss of his 24 acres. (Trial Exhibit 17).
At trial, conflicting testimony was offered as to the fair value of the lost 24 acres. Mr.
Isley, who had paid nothing for it, stated that it "wasn't worth very much because it was dry
sage brush farm ground." (T. 73). The County Assessor's records showed the appraisal value
of the lost property was $1,800. (Trial Exhibit 43).
Notwithstanding all of said testimony, the Court failed to award any damages to
Smedley as a consequence of Glausers' wrongful conveyance, even as an offset to the
amounts found owing by Smedley to Glausers. Initially the District Court omitted any
menion of the loss of the 24 acres in its ruling. Only after the post-trial hearing on Smedley's
Objection to Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Judgment, did the District Court even
consider the loss suffered by Smedley as a result of Glausers' actions. (R. 319, ^f 23). Even
then, in the Judgment, Order, and Decree, the Court declared:
12.
The Defendant's claim to a right of offset against the
judgment amounts he owes to Glauser for the value of the
acreage Glauser conveyed to Isley is denied. Plaintiffs
stipulated, and the Court orders, that the promised consideration
received for the conveyance to Bill Isley runs with the land and,
consequently, as a result of the Court's previous finding that
Smedley's conveyance to Glauser of the Idaho [Salmon]
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Property is an equitable mortgage rather than an outright
conveyance, that Smedley as well as Plaintiffs are entitled to the
benefits of the promised consideration, release of the
Agricultural Lease upon the ultimate sale of the Glauser Idaho
[Salmon] Property.
In its Judgment, Order, and Decree, the District Court properly exercised its equitable
powers in declaring Smedley's conveyance of the Salmon Property to Glausers as a security
conveyance to be treated similarly to a mortgage. However, it failed to grasp the significance
of the fact that through that conveyance Glausers held legal title to the Salmon Property,
knowing that they did not enjoy the beneficial title thereto.
The imposition of a resulting trust is invoked by the equitable powers of the court
where legal title to property is transferred but the intent of the parties is for the transferor to
retain the beneficial interest in the property. Boatright v. Perkins, 894 P2d 1091 (Okl.
1995); Estate of Hull v. Williams, 885 P.2d 1153 (Idaho App. 1994). Upon receipt of the
legal title to the Salmon Property Glausers became the trustees of a resulting trust in favor
of Smedley, with the duties and liabilities of a trustee over the Salmon Property. 76 Am Jur
2 193-194, Trusts § 162. The sole duty of a trustee in a resulting trust or a constructive trust
is to convey the property to the beneficiary." 76 Am Jur 2d 363, Trusts, § 365. Glausers
ignored those responsibilities and must pay to Smedley the value of that portion of the
Salmon Property entrusted to them which was lost due to their malfeasance.
In ignoring the evidence of the significant loss suffered to Smedley by Glausers'
wrongful conveyance to Mr. Isley, the District Court erroneously disregarded damages to be
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awarded to Smedley pursuant to his Counterclaim as an offset to any amounts found owning
by Smedley under the Agreement.
IV.

The District Court erred in receiving and considering negative reputational
evidence concerning the truthfulness of Smedley when that was not an element
of any claim asserted by Plaintiffs.
Prior to trial, on or about January 8,1999, Plaintiffs submitted Plaintiffs Witness List

for trial which included four individuals whose anticipated testimony would be exclusively
restricted to an alleged general reputation of Smedley for dishonesty in his real estate and
development transactions with parties other than Glausers. (R. 218-219). No assertions
were made by Plaintiffs that these reputational witnesses had any personal knowledge about
any of the transactions between Smedley and Glausers.
In response to Plaintiffs' Witness List, on January 14, 1999, Smedley filed a Motion
in Limine pursuant to Rule 404(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, requesting that the Court
prohibit Plaintiffs from eliciting any reputational testimony. (R. 278-281). On January 19,
1999, a hearing was held before Judge Allphin on Smedley's Motion. Contrary to Rule
404(a), Judge Allphin ruled that Plaintiffs would be allowed to introduce testimony of
Smedley's reputation generally, as long as no specific individual factual incidents were the
subject of that testimony.
At trial two of the four projected witnesses were called to testify: John Scott Carter,
the Layton City Community Development Director; and Beverly Miles Olsen, a real estate
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agent in Davis County for 19 years. Both were asked the following questions concerning
Smedley's general reputation and responded with a virtually identical answer:
Question:

Answer:
Question:

Do you know the general reputation of Dale Smedley for
truth and voracity in and about the community of Davis
County at the present time?
Yes.
Will you please tell the Court whether it is good or bad?

Answer:

Generally his reputation is bad.

(Transcript at 271-272 [Carter] and 276 [Olsen]).
Prior to Mr. Carter's response to the first question regarding Smedley's general
reputation, Smedley's counsel reasserted his objection pursuant to Rule 404(a) on the
grounds that any lack of the general reputational qualities about which counsel was inquiring
were not elements of any claim before the Court and therefore were irrelevant and
inadmissible. (Transcript at 271-272). The Judge overruled the objection and allowed the
testimony from both witnesses. (Transcript at 272).
Rule 404(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion." In other words, unless the character of
Smedley was an element of the claim, evidence of that particular character trait of Smedley
is inadmissible.

See Advisory Committee Note, Rule 404.

Similarly, the Advisory

Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence (concerning the virtually identical Federal Rule
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404) concluded that character evidence in civil cases should not be admitted unless it was in
issue.
Although Smedley has been unable to discover any civil cases in Utah concerning the
application of this Rule to prohibit general reputational testimony, surrounding jurisdictions
have supported Smedley's assertion.
It is well-settled that evidence of the good or bad character of either party
to a civil action is generally inadmissible. Strickland v. Jackson, 23 N.C.App.
603,209 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1974). Such evidence is regarded as too remote to be of
substantial value, as tending to confuse the issues and unduly protract the trial and,
most importantly, as offering a temptation to the jury to reward a good life or
punish a bad one instead of deciding the issues before them.
Fehciano v. City and County of Honolulu, 611 P.2d 989,991 (Haw. 1980)[emphasis added].
Similarly, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held:
We agree with defendant that character evidence is admissible in a civil case where
character is an issue, [citations omitted] Nonetheless, the admissibility of character
evidence in a civil case is narrower than in a criminal case, and the trait of character,
desired to be proved by testimony in the form of opinion or evidence of reputation
must be directly in issue. . . . Here, defendant's veracity was not an element of the
claim [citation omitted] and, while credibility is always a factor in any case, it was not
directly in issue here. Consequently, evidence of defendant's reputation for
truthfulness was irrelevant and properly excluded.
Baum v. Orosco, 1M P.2d 1, 3 (N.M. 1987). Finally, the Kansas Supreme Court required
the "strict" enforcement of it version of Rule 404 in declaring that "evidence may not be
admitted for the purpose of proving the defendant's inclination, tendency, attitude or
disposition to commit a civil wrong." Furthermore, that court declared that "Evidence that
a person committed a civil wrong on a specified occasion is inadmissible to prove his or her
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disposition to commit a civil wrong on another specified occasion." Brunett v. Albrecht, 810
P.2d276,280(Kan.l991).
The issues determined by the Court in this matter were based solely upon a quiet title
claim, and a breach of contract claim. Neither of these claims require the proof of any
element relating to honesty, voracity, or strength of reputation or character. The unnecessary
insertion of these issues into the trial were clearly prejudicial in nature. In fact the Court
based its Findings related to the issues raised in Points III and IV above, in part upon its
declaration that the testimony of Smedley lacked "any indicia of trustworthiness." (R. 428,
Tflj 48 and 49). No evidence other than that received from Mr. Carter and Ms. Olsen was
elicited concerning any alleged untruthfulness of the Smedley. Pursuant to Rule 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence, Plaintiffs should have been prohibited from calling either of the
"character" witnesses for the purpose of giving any testimony concerning the alleged
reputation or bad character of Smedley. Such testimony should correctly have been excluded
since its "probative value [was] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Smedley requests that this Court set aside the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by Judge Allphin, reverse the Judgment
entered herein, and remand the matter for a new trial with instructions (1) that the District
Court allow Smedley to introduce relevant and credible evidence as to the true character of
the Davis County Property conveyance as supplemental to the written Agreement, (2) that
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the District Court recognize and give Smedley credit for the work provided and real property
conveyed to Glausers in full and substitute satisfaction of Smedley's payment obligations
under the Agreement, and (3) that the District Court refuse any attempt to introduce
reputational evidence of Smedley which is not specifically required to prove an element of
Plaintiffs' claims.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ ^ day of November, 1999.
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH

T. Richard Davis*
Attorneys for Appellant Dale T. Smedley
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was served
by United States mail, first class postage prepaid, on the % day of November 1999, on the
following:

Craig L. Taylor
CRAIG L. TAYLOR, P.C.
47 NORTH 300 WEST, SUITE 3
KAYSVILLE, UTAH 84037

267455 1
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ADDENDUM

A G R E E M E N T
THIS AGREEMENT, entered into this 29th day of January, 1979,
by and between DALE T. SMEDLEY, hereinafter called "Smedley",
and GLAPSER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., hereinafter called
"Glausor",
W I T N E S S E T H ;
WHEREAS, Glauser owns certain real property located in
the North Half of the Southeast Quarter of Section 14, Township
4 North, Ranqe 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian, as set forth in
Exhibit "A" attached hereto, and
WHEREAS, said property is subject to certain liens and
encumbrances of record, and
WHEREAS, Smedlev is the owner of certain real property
and innrovenents thereon consistinq of eiqhty-six (36) storage
units, which oronerty is described nore particularly by Exhibit
"A" attached hereto, and
WHEREAS, Smedlev desires to acnuire the Glauser property
described above and proposes to exchanqe, as partial payment
thereof, the Smedley property set forth in Exhibit "A",and
WHEREAS, in addition to exchanqe of real property between
the narties, Smedley is reauired to provide additional consideration to Glauser,
NOW, THEREFORE, it is aqreed between the parties as follows :
1.

Exchanqe, Description.

Glauser agrees to convey

to Smedley all of his riqht, title and interest to that real
pronertv described as "Glauser Property" and set forth in
Exhibit "A" attached hereof, said Exhibit beinq made a part
of this aqreement as if fully set forth at this tine.
2.

Inspection.

Smedley acknowledqes having heretofore

exanined the Glauser property and the recorded chain of title
as reflected by the records of the Davis County Recorder's
office; and Smedley does hereby accept said property in its
present condition subject to all liens, mortgages, easements,
and/or encumbrances of any kind which are either a matter of
record or subject to visible inspection on the premises.
^*

Pa

yroent»

For and in consideration of the conveyance

set forth in Paragraph 1 above, Smedley agrees to pay to Glauser
the following:
a.

Smedley will convey all rights, title and

interest in the "Smedley Property" set forth in Exhibit "A"
attached hereto, subject to the right and obligation* of Smedley
to manage said rental units affixed to the realty.

Smedley

agrees to keep said units rented and fully maintained for the
benefit of Glauser and agrees to pay to Glauser each month
the sun of Two thousand dollars (§2,000.00), said payments
to be made beginning the month of Tebruary, 1979, and to continue thereafter in accordance with the terms of this agreement.
Said payments shall be made on or before the last day of each
month. It is acknowledged between the parties that the present
rental income on the storage units exceeds the sum of $2,000.00
per month.

Said additional rental income shall be used by

Snedlev to provide the maintenance, upkeep, and costs necessary
for the payment of any and all repairs, taxes, insurance premiums, and any other costs incidental to the management of the
real property.

Smedley aqrees to assume full responsibility

for any expenses incidental to the maintenance and upkeep of
the premises and agrees to indemnify and hold Glauser harmless
therefrom.

In the event and at such time as said rental units

mav increase in rental value, it is then agreed between the

-3parties that any additional revenue realized from said rental
shall be split between the parties on a proportional basis
which the increased rental value has to the present rental
value as of the date of this agreement.
Smedley's obligations for maintenance and the management of the properties as set forth above shall continue so
long as Mel Glauser or his wife, Kathy Glauser, shall live;
following the death of the survivor of either of them, Smedley's
obligation on said property as set forth in this agreement
shall cease.
b.

Smedley further agrees to establish a credit

line at Beehive Travel, or some other travel agency* as agreed
to between the parties in writing, in an amount of Six Thousand
Dollars ($6,000.00).

Said amount or line of credit shall be

payable to the order of Mel Glauser and/or Kathy Glauser to
pay for any and all costs and expenses incurred by Glausers
for travel/recreation or incidental expenses incurred therein
up to said amount.

It is agreed between the parties that said

line of credit shall be used exclusively for the purpose of
travel and/or recreation by Glausers, or any person which they
may designate, and said benefit may be accumulated from one
year to the next at the discretion of Glausers; however, said
line or account of credit shall have no cash surrender value
of any kind whatsoever.
It is agreed between the parties that this account
shall continue for a period of at least thirteen (13) years
until credit has been made for the year of February 1991, and
said account shall continue in existence so long thereafter
as either Mel Glauser or his wife may live.
To guarantee the funding on this account, Smedley

-4agrees to pay in escrow with First National Bank of Layton
securities in an amount of at least Three hundred thousand
dollars ($300,000.00), which sum may be payable to said travel
and recreation account in annual increments as described hereinabove
in the event Smedley fails to annually fund said line of credit.
Said escrov; may also be used to guarantee and pay that Two
thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per month obligation set forth
in Paraqraph 3a. above in the event or upon the condition that
rental income from the properties fails to produce sufficient
revenue to meet that obligation.

Said security shall, not be

removed from said bank without written authorization of Glauser,
and Smedley agrees to furnish to Glauser annually verification
of said securities on deposit with said bank,together with
the initial escrow agreement directing the bank to make said
payments on or before March 31st of any year that Smedley has
not made the funding deposit called for herein.
4

*

Default.

Each of the parties agree that in the event

of default of either party that the party not in default shall
be entitled to reasonable court costs and attorney's fees
incurred in the enforcement of this agreement, whether or not
suit is commenced.

Each party shall be entitled to all rights

of redress and remedies accorded by law in the event of default.
5.

Fire Insurance Policy.

Smedley agrees that during the

life of Mel and/or Kathy Glauser to keep the Smedley properties
referred to hereinabove insurtfa in an amount not less than

6.

Risk of Loss.

Risk of loss with regard to the "Smedley

Properties" described in Exhibit "A" shall rest with Smedley
during the lifetime of either Mel Glauser or Kathy Glauser,
and loss of the structures attached to said realty shall not

-5abrogate the terms of this agreement.nor the obligation and/or
rights of the parties.
7.

Time, Waiver.

Time is of the essence with respect

to the obligations of the parties hereunder, including the
obligation of Smedley to make payments called for herein.
Should Glauser fail to insist on strict performance on the
part of the Buyer, and specifically, should Smedley make payments in amounts less than the amounts, or at times different
than the times provided for herein, such shall not be deemed
to alter the terms of this contract as to the remedies of
Glauser herein set forth or available to him under law, and
such shall not be construed to be a waiver or relinquishment
for the future of any such obligations on the part of Smedley.
**• Notice.

Any notice required or permitted to be

given hereunder shall be deemed to have been served when such
has been delivered to the following addresses or placed in
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to:
Glauser:

Glauser Construction Company, Inc.
1121 E. Sherwood Drive
Kaysville, Utah 84037

Smedley:

Dale T. Smedley
Route 1, Mountain Green
Morgan, Utah
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*

Successors.

This agreement shall be binding on the

parties hereto and their successors or assigns in accordance
with the terms of this agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned parties have executed
this agreement in duplicate, either of which may constitute
an original, this 29th day of January, 1979.
GLAUSER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.

^.s£k^

Statp of Utah ) ^
County of Davis)
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of February, 1979.

't u e art /•*, T& Cv^nuV^fl rt Q
Notary Public
^
Residing at Lay tonf> Utah.

GLAUSER vs. SMEDLEY
CHART OF CONSIDERATION
Strict Construction of Agreement per Glauser
SMEDLEY RECEIVES:

GLAUSER RECEIVES:

Melanie Acres
32 acres land
Value: approx. $165,000

Income Stream
$2,000 per month for 15
years
$360,000
Vacation value
$6,000 per year
years $78,000

for

Storage Sheds
$143,140 to $165,000
Salmon Property
$156#451 to $300,000
TOTAL: $737,591 to $903,000
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GLAUSER vs. SMEDLEY
CHART OF CONSIDERATION
Strict Construction of Agreement per Glauser as Performed
SMEDLEY RECEIVES:

GLAUSER RECEIVES:

Melanie Acres
32 acres land
Value: approx. $165,000

Income Stream
$2,000 per month
years
$360,000

for 15

Tax assistance on Sheds
$20,703

Vacation value
$6,000 per year
years $78,000

for

Tax assistance on Salmon
$8,960
Vacation waiver
$24,000

TOTAL $218,663
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Storage Sheds
$143,140 to $165,000
Salmon Property
$156,451 to $300,000
Smedley Estates Lots
$5,000 to $25,000
Cottonwood Unit 3 Lot
$12,500
Heritage Acres and
Garden work
$56,482

Lakeview

TOTAL: $737,591 to $996,982

Craig L. Taylor (A4421)
CRAIG L. TAYLOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
447 North 300 West, Suite 3
Kaysville, UT 84037
Telephone: (801) 544-9955
Fax:
(801) 544-9977

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Glauser Storage, L.L.C., a
Utah Limited Liability
Company, dba Mountain View
Storage; Steven D. Glauser,
an individual; Kristme G.
Lofts, an individual;
Richard M. Glauser, an
individual; Susa:: G.
Larsen, an individual;
Craig K. Glauser, an
individual

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No.

960700199

Plaintiffs,
Judge Michael G. Allphin

-vsDale T. Smedley, an
individual; and DOES I - X.
Defendants,

Trial in this matter was regularly conducted on the 28th day
of January 1999, before the Honorable Michael G. Allphin, one of
the Judges of the above-entitled Court.

Plaintiffs Steven D.

Glauser, Richard M. Glauser, Susan G. Larsen, and Craig K.
Glauser, appeared personally and as members of Plaintiff Glauser
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Storage, L.L.C.

Plaintiffs were represented by their attorneys

Craig L. Taylor and Thomas Price of the law firm Craig L. Taylor,
P.C.

The Defendant Dale T. Smedley appeared personally, and was

represented by his attorney, T. Richard Davis of the law firm
Callister, Nebeker & McCullough. The Court having heard the
testimony of the parties and other witnesses, having received
exhibits into evidence and reviewed the same, having received
certain stipulations of the parties, having reviewed the files
and records herein, having taken the matter under advisement, and
be-ng fully advised m the premises, now makes its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT.
1.

Glauser Storage, L.L.C. ("Glauser Storage"), is the fee

title owner of certain real property, which is the subject of
this action, located in Davis County, State of Utah, more
particularly described as follows.
Beginning ~t a point North OOOS'SO" East 1266.57 feet
and North S9O34,30" West 1363.86 feet from the South
East corner of Section 4; Township 4 North, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Meridian; thence South 89O01'50u West
108.05 feet; thence South 0O36'02» East 206.17 feet;
thence
North 89043f07" East 105.36 feet; thence North
]
0O03 30" East 207,47 feet to the point of beginning.
Together with the R/WS described in 653-391
Beginning at a point 1220.86 feet North 89034'30"
West
along Section line and 596 feet North 0O08'30n East
parallel to the East line of Section 4 from the South
East corner of Section 4; Township 4 North Range 1
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West, Sale Lake Meridian; running thence North
0O08'30M East 327 feet; thence North 89034' 30" West
148 feet; tnence South 0O08'30n West 327 feet; thence
South 89034'30" East 148 feet to the point of
beginning. Together with R/W described in 653-3 91.
2.

Glauser Storage is the successor in interest of Glauser

Construction Co. Inc.("Glauser Construction") and Melvm D.
Glauser and Kathleen Glauser, both of whom are deceased. (Glauser
Construction Co. Inc. and Melvm D. Glauser and Kathleen Glauser
are sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to as "Glauser").
The individual plaintiffs,

Steven D. Glauser, K n s t m e G. Lofts,

Richard M. Glauser, Susan G. Larsen, and Craig K. Glauser, are
each members of Glauser Storage and are the heirs of Melvm D.
Glauser and Kathleen Glauser.
3.

The "Glauser Storage Sheds" consist of 36 storage sheds

constructed on the real property described m paragraph 1 above,
located in the city of Layton, Davis County, State of Utah.

The

Glauser Storage Sheds and the real property upon which they are
constructed, described in paragraph 1 above, are hereinafter
referred to as the "Glauser Storage Sheds Property."
4.

The individual plaintiffs, Steven D. Glauser, Kristine

G. Lofts, Richard M. Glauser, Susan G. Larsen, and Craig K.
Glauser are joint fee title owners of record of approximately 188
acres of real property located in Lemhi County, state of Idaho,
which is also the subject of this action and is hereinafter
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referred to as the Glauser Idaho Property.

The Glauser Idaho

Property is legally described as follows:
The SHSHSEtfSEtf; S^SKSW^SEtf; SHSHSEtfSWtf and the
SHSXSWVfSWM in Section 1, Township 21 N., Range 21 E.,
Boise Meridian, ALSO the SMSHSEtfSEM; SHSHSWMSEfc;
SHSHSEMSWVf in Section 2, Township 21 N. , Range 21 E.,
Boise Meridian, ALSO a parcel of land located in the
NEtfNWtf and the NWViNEVf of Section 11, Township 21 N. ,
Range 21 E., Boise Meridian, described as follows:
Beginning at the Northwest corner of the NEKNWVf of said
section, run thence South, 544 feet; thence East, 820
feet; thence North, SO feet; thence East, 100 feet;
thence South, 60 feet; thence East 1720 feet; thence
North, 544 feet; thence West, 2640 feet to the POINT OF
BEGINNING.
ALSO: The NEVflJEK and the NMNMSE^EM in section 11,
Townshio 21 N, , Range 21 E., Boise Meridian, and ALSO
the NWMNWM; NMNMSWVOJWtf, NKNHSEiflJWK and the NE^NWM in
section 12, Township 21 N., Range 21 E., Boise
Meridian, all located in Lemhi County, State of Idaho.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM: A part of the Northwest Quarter of
Section 12, Township 21 N. Range 21 E., Boise Meridian:
Beginning at the Northeast corner of said Quarter
Section, and running thence South, 1623.0 feet; thence
West, 1070.27 feet; thence North, 1628.0 feet; thence
East, 1070.27 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING...
AND FURTHER EXCEFTING THEREFROM: A part of the SWM of
Section 1 and a part of the SEM of Section 2, Township
21 North, Range 21 East, Boise Meridian: Beginning at
the SW corner of said Section 1; thence East 1401.11
feet; thence North 3 degrees West 355 feet; thence West
3,036.11 feet; thence South 355 feet more or less to
the South Section Line of said Section 2; thence East
1,635 feet more or less to the Point of Beginning
5.

Dale T. Smedley, the Defendant in this action, claims an

interest in the two parcels of real property which are the
sub]ect of this action by having filed and recorded certain
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Notices of Interest against each of the properties after the
deaths of Melvm and Kathleen Glauser.
6.

On or about January 29, 1979, Defendant Smedley entered

into an Agreement whereby Smedley and Glauser agreed to exchange
a subdivision known as Melanie Acres, containing at least 40
building lots owned by Glauser for real property containing 86
storage sheds owned by Smedley, together with some other
considerations, required of Smedley, including: (1) the continued
management and payment of maintenance, upkeep and taxes on the
Glauser Storage Sheds Property for the benefit of Glauser for as
long as Mel and Kathleen Glauser lived; (2) a guaranteed income
stream of $2,000.00 per month to Mel and Kathleen Glauser for as
long as they lived; (3) the provision of an annual vacation fund
of $6,000.00 per year for Mel and Kathleen Glauser for as long as
they 1 ived; and (4) the establishment of a $300,000.00 escrow
securing Smedley's payment and performance of these obligations.
The Agreement was reduced to writing and presented to the court
in form of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 (hereinafter the "1979
Agreement").
7.

The Court finds that the 1979 Agreement (Plaintiffs1

Exhibit 1) is clear on it's face and unambiguous in its terms
relating to the transfer of title of each of the properties to
the respective parties.

The Court finds from the 1979 Agreement
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that it was the intention of the parties that Defendant Smedley
transfer Fee Title in the Glauser Storage Sheds Property to
Glauser Construction in exchange for Glauser1s transfer of Fee
Title in the Melanie Acres property to Smedley.
8.

In accordance with the 1S79 Agreement, Defendant Smedley

and his wife Helen conveyed fee title to the Storage Sheds to
Glauser Construction pursuant to a Warranty Deed dated January
29, 1979 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2); and Mel and Kathleen Glauser
conveyed the Melanie Acres property to the Smedleys pursuant to a
Warranty Deed dated January 29, 1979 (Defendant's Exhibit 32),
9.

Defendant Smedley claims an interest or estate in the

Glauser Storage Sheds Property adverse to that of the Plaintiffs.
The Court finds that there is nothing within the 1979 Agreement
or the Warranty Deed from Smedleys to Glauser Construction upon
which Defendant Smedley may base his adverse claim.

Moreover,

there are no other written documents existing evidencing a
reversionary right in Smedley, nor any obligation on the part of
Glauser or the other Plaintiffs to reconvey the Glauser Storage
Sheds to Smedley or anyone else.
10.

The Court finds from the 1979 Agreement (Plaintiffs1

Exhibit 1) entered into by the parties and the Warranty Deed from
Smedleys to Glauser Construction (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2) that
Defendant Smedley has no interest in the Glauser Storage Sheds;
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that the Notice of Interest Smedley caused to be recorded against
the Glauser Storage Sheds Property is null and void and of no
force or effect; and that the Court should enter an order
quieting title to the Glauser Storage Sheds Property in Glauser
Storage and the other individual plaintiffs.
11.

Pursuant to paragraph 4 of the 1979 Agreement

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1), the Court finds that the Plaintiffs are
entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses
against the Defendant, which is considered in more detail below.
12.

Concerning Plaintiff's claim of Breach of Contract on

the part of the Defendant, the Court finds that Plaintiffs'
predecessors in interest fulfilled all of their obligations under
the 1979 Agreement by conveying to Smedley the real property
described in paragraph 1 of the 1979 Agreement known as Melanie
Acres,
13.

Pursuant to the 1979 Agreement, and for and in

consideration of Glauser's conveyance of the Melanie Acres
property to Smedley, Smedley covenanted and promised to manage
the rental storage units affixed to the real property and agreed
to keep the units rented and fully maintained for the benefit of
Glauser, and agreed to pay Glauser each month the sum of
$2,000.00 beginning with the month of February 1979.
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14. The parties acknowledged in the 1979 Agreement that the
rental income then currently exceeded the sum of $2,000.00 per
month, and that the additional rental income would be used by
Smedley to provide the maintenance, upkeep, and costs necessary
for the payment of any and all repairs, taxes, insurance
premiums, and any other costs incidental to the management of the
real property.
15. ^medley further covenanted and promised pursuant to the
1979 Agreement, and for and m

consideration of Glauser1s

conveyance of Melanie Acres, to establish a credit line m

the

amount of $6,000.00 per year to pay for any and all costs and
expenses incurred by Glausers for travel, recreation, or
incidental expenses incurred for vacations.
16. At the discretion of the Glausers, the amount of
$6,000.00 per year could be used in that year or be accumulated
from one year to the next.

It was agreed between the parties

that the account should continue for a period of at least
thirteen years through the year 1991, and thereafter should
continue so long as either Mel Glauser or his wife lived.
17. The evidence produced at the time of trial, indicates
that beginning in 1984, and continuing for a period of four (4)
years, Smedley breacned his obligation to annually fund the
$6,000.00 for the benefit of Mel Glauser or Kathy Glauser to be
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used for travel expenses m

the amount of $24,000.00, and the

Court should award the Plaintiffs' ]udgment against Defendant in
the amount of $24,000.00. The Court took this figure from the
admission by Mr. Smedley both in his testimony and other written
documents that he provided indicating that it was his belief that
he owed Glauser $24,000 for the travel expenses for four years
beginning m

1984 through 1987.

18. The Court finds that Defendant Smedley further breached
his obligations provided in the 1979 Agreement, in that he failed
to pay the property taxes on the Glauser Storage Sheds during the
period of 1979 through 1994.
19. The parties stipulated m

connection with Plaintiffs'

Exhibit 27 that the amount of the property taxes that Defendant
failed to pay was $20,703.33, as follows:
Amount

Tax

2,458.45

1984

3,545.11

1985

3,641.99

1986

3,651.52

1987

3,143.22

1988

989 48

1989
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$ 20,703.38
20. The Court should award the Plaintiffs* judgment against
Defendant in the amount of $20,703.38.
21. The Court finds that Smedley further breached his
obligation under the 1979 Agreement in that he failed to pay or
provide for the maintenance, upkeep, and costs necessary for
repairs.
22. One of the witnesses, Terry Smedley, who managed the
storage sheds from 198 8 until they were turned over to the
Glausers, testified that in the spring of 1994, the roofs were
worn out, and that the storage sheds didn't look good, and the
asphalt was bad.

He further testified that m March 1994, Gary-

Egbert was hired to do seme roof repair.
23. The Court finds that in January and February 1995,
additional roof repairs were needed in the amount of $16,000.00.
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 26 shows that Plaintiffs paid $5,000.00 on
January 30, 1995, and $10,000.00 on February 10, 1995, for roof
repairs.

The Court finds that these repairs are reasonably

attributed to the roofs being worn out prior to the Glausers
taking control of the Storage Sheds in late October of 1994, and
the Court should, therefore, award Plaintiffs judgment against
the Defendant in the amount of $16,000.00.
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24. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 26 shows that Plaintiffs paid the
sum of $2,037.00 for asphalt repairs on July 10, 1995. The Court
finds that these asphalt repairs were needed were attributable to
that time when Defendant Smedley had the responsibility for the
maintenance of the Clauser Storage Sheds Property. Accordingly,
the Court should enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and
against the Defendant m

the amount of $2,037.00

25. The Plaintiffs' remaining claims for repair and
maintenance should be denied for lack of proof that those items
were a result of inadequate maintenance during the period that
the Smedleys had the responsibility for maintenance and upkeep.
26

Defendant Smedley agreed in the 1979 Agreement with

Glauser to pay the amount of $300,000.00 into an escrow with
First National Eank to secure Smedley1s obligations as described
above.

All of the parties in this lawsuit acknowledged that

Defendant Smedley failed to fund the $300,000.00 escrow to
guarantee and secure his obligations.
27

The 1979 Agreement was orally modified with respect to

the $300,000.00 escrow m order to provide for other security to
guarantee Smedley's payment and performance of his abovementioned obligations.
28. In place of the escrow, Smedley gave Glauser a Mortgage
en 274.97 acres m Salmon, Idaho as evidenced by the Mortgage
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executed by Smedleys on the fourth day of December 1979, and
presented to the Court in the form of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3.
29. In addition, and in connection with Smedley's conveyance
of the Mortgage to Glauser as security for his obligations,
Smedley promised to pay the property taxes on that Salmon, Idaho
Property.
30. As shown m Plaintiffs' Exhibit 28, beginning with the
Tax Year 1983 and continuing to the present, Defendant Smedley
failed to make those tax payments m

the stipulated amount of

$8,960.86, and the Court should enter judgment m

favor of

Plaintiffs against the Defendant in the amount of $8,960.86.
31. The Court finds that the parties intended that the
Salmon, Idaho Property was to be used as security for the Smedley
obligations under the 1979 Agreement.
32. On March 13, 1980, Smedley made a conveyance by Warranty
Deed (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5), which was recorded on March 13,
1980, as document number 151496 in the Lemhi County Recorder's
Office, State of Idaho, to Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest,
Melvm D. Glauser, of approximately 211 acres of the Salmon,
Idaho Property. The Court finds that this conveyance was given to
Glauser as a security for Smedley's obligations under the 1979
Agreement, rather than as an outright conveyance of the property.
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33. The Court finds that the intent of the parties in
connection with that subsequent conveyance was that Mr. Glauser
wanted further security in having Fee Title so that Mr. Smedley
could not continue to transfer or convey off pieces of this
property, which he had done during the period 1979-80.
34

The Court finds that because the Warranty Deed was

given as a security, that this Court lacks jurisdiction to deal
with the Glauser Idaho Property described in paragraph 4 above.
It appears to the Court that the appropriate remedy for the
Plaintiffs in this case would be to file an action in the State
of Idaho to foreclose their Warranty Deed as an Equitable
Mortgage or security interest in that property.
35. The Plaintiffs are entitled to foreclose the Glauser
Idaho Property, because Smedley breached his obligations under
the 1979 Agreement which were secured by his conveyance of the
Glauser Idaho Property to Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest,
but Plaintiffs must do so in Idaho.
36.

In or about June 1993, Mel and Kathy Glauser conveyed

to Bill Isley by Quit Claim Deed a portion of the Salmon, Idaho
Property, for and m consideration of Isley's promise to release
his rights in an Agricultural Lease encumbering the entire
Salmon, Idaho parcel through the year 2007 at such time as that
Property encumbered by the Agricultural Lease is sold. Bill Isley
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testified that the amount of property conveyed was approximately
5 or 6 acres. Other evidence indicated that the amount was
approximately 24 acres, and the discrepancy may have been due to
overlapping deeds in the chain of title. The amount is unclear.
37.

Smedley claims the right to an offset against the

judgment amounts he owes no Glauser for the value of the acreage
Glauser conveyed to Isley.
38.

The evidence of values for the Idaho Property ranged

from $130 per acre, as testified to by Bill Isley, to $1,800 per
acre as testified to by the Smedleys.
39.

Mel and Kathy Glauser received no other consideration

except Isley's promise to release the Agricultural Lease upon the
ultimate sale of the Idaho Property.
40.

The Court finds that the evidence is insufficient to

support a finding as to the amount of property conveyed to Isley
or the value per acre to be attributed to the property so
conveyed.
41.

The Court finds that the promised consideration

received for the conveyance to Bill Isley runs with the land and,
consequently, as a result of the Court's previous finding that
Smedley1s conveyance to Glauser of the Glauser Idaho Property is
an equitable mortgage rather than an outright conveyance, that
Smedley as well as Glauser are entitled to the benefits of the
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promised consideration, that is, release of the Agricultural
Lease upon ultimate sale of the Glauser Idaho Property.
Plaintiffs are m agreement and stipulated that Eill Isley's
promise to release the Agricultural-Lease should be treated as
running with the Land.
42.

Plaintiffs stipulated, and the Court finds that the

conveyances by Smedley to Glauser Construction Co. of Lots 8 and
10 in Smedley Estates Subdivision Phase 2 Block 3, Lemhi County,
Idaho, should be treated m the same manner as the Glauser Idaho
Property, that is, as an equitable mortgage securing Smedley's
obligations to Glauser which the Court has found are m default,
as set forth above. Thusf as with the Glauser Idaho Property,
Plaintiffs are entitled to foreclose their interest m

Lots 8 and

10 in the appropriate Court having jurisdiction over real
property m Lemhi County, Idaho.
43. While the Court has found that in many of these areas
the Defendant Smedley breached his obligations, there were some
additional areas which the court didn't have sufficient evidence
to conclude that a breach existed, including, for instance, with
respect to the $2,000.00 per month rental income.
44. Some of the documents indicate perhaps all of the
$2,000.00 per month v;as not paid during the relevant period as
well.
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45. Defendant Smedley claims that he transferred Lots a and
10 in Smedley Estates Subdivision Phase 2 Block 3, Lemhi County,
Idaho, to Glauser in. consideration for taxes on the Idaho
property. The Defendant further claims that he transferred a
Cottonwood unit number three lot and was not reimbursed by
Glauser for it, and that it was also transferred m

consideration

for some of his obligations in this transaction.
46. Even though it is possible that Smedley's transfer of
the two lots in Smedley Estates in Idaho might very well link
with the payment of the taxes, the evidence is insufficient and
unreliable m

support of these clams.

There is no evidence

except Smedley's testimony of oral agreements during Mel
Glauser's lifetime; Mel Glauser and Smedley had ongoing business
relationships for many, many years, and there is no way to link
these particular transactions, but for the oral agreement that
Smedley now claims.
47. The Court also finds that there is a problem concerning
the proof of value for these pieces of property that Smedley
claims would offset the taxes.

The evidence was unreliable and

inconclusive concerning what, if any, value would be ascribed to
the parcels
48. The Defendant further alleges that he performed
$56,482.00 worth of work for Glauser in Heritaqe Acres and

m
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Lakeview Garden Estates in or about 1988 to offset his
delinquencies and defaults for the previous four (4) years.

With

regard to Defendant Smedley's testimony of work performed
pursuant to an alleged oral agreement to satisfy his obligations,
delinquencies, and defaults, the Court finds this evidence
inadmissable under Rules 403 and 601 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence because it is based on hearsay, the probative value of
the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and
the evidence lacks any indicia of trustworthiness.

That evidence

is being offered to allegedly satisfy obligations, delinquencies,
and defaults pursuant to an inadmissable oral agreement.
49. The Court

finds that the oral agreement that Defendant

Smedley testified to regarding the transfer of the Cottonwood
unit three lot is inadmissable, as well, for the same reasons.
50. In connection with Defendant's Exhibit 38, which is a
photocopy of a ledger kept by Mr. Glauser, the Court finds that
Mr. Glauser did not total this.

It appears that at some point in

time perhaps April 15 of 1988, the parties were reviewing their
business transaction.

Mr. Glauser may have brought this to Mr.

Smedley, but there is no way for the Court to determine whether
that was the final resolution as it pertained to the development
of those lots.

It appears from the Court's original exhibit that

it was after the fact, it could be Mr. Smedley's, but it appears
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not to be Mr. Glausers.

It was done in pencil, and the court has

no reason to believe that perhaps there weren't other
transactions.

There are payments to Mr. Smedley, several on this

ledger, but the court has no way to know whether or not there
were further payments being made. Accordingly, the Court finds
madmissable the alleged oral agreement and the evidence that Mr.
Smedley is presenting to the court m

connection with Defendant's

Exhibit 38.
51. Finally, the 1988 work Defendant Smedley alleges as
satisfaction of his defaults and delinquencies was performed six
years prior to Mr. and Mrs. Glauser's passing away, and the
Court *s finds that Smedley's claims of work performed allegedly
to satisfy his defaults and obligations should be barred by
latches due to his unreasonable delay and lack of diligence in
failing to make any assertion or to memorialize the same with
Glauser while he was alive, and the unfair prejudice to
Plaintiffs as a result of Smedley1s waiting until after the
Glausers1 deaths to make this assertion.
52. Because the Court has found that the Defendant has
breached his obligations under the 1979 Agreement and has
inappropriately filed a Notice of Interest against the Glauser
Storage Sheds Property, the Court finds that pursuant to
paragraph 4 of the 1979 Agreement, the Court should award
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Plaintiffs' attorney's fees, because they have prevailed in that
portion in the cause of action that deals specifically with the
1979 Agreement, and with the Glauser Storage Sheds Property.
53. Plaintiffs have not prevailed as it relates to the Quiet
Title Action on the Glauser Idaho Property.
54. Having considered the Plaintiff's Affidavit of
Attorney's Fees and Expenses relating to the portion of this
action on which they have prevailed, the Court finds that
reasonable attorney's fees to prosecute this action is in the
amount of $20,000.00, and the court should award judgment against
Defendant on behalf of Plaintiffs for attorney's fees and
expenses in the amount of $2 0,000.00.
55.

The Court finds that the judgment amounts to be awarded

Plaintiffs as set fornh above, in the total amount of $71,701.24
(exclusive of attorneys fees) are fixed as of particular times
and the amounts of the losses can and have been calculated with
mathematical certainty.
56.

Consequently, except as to the attorneys fees awarded,

Plaintiffs should be awarded prejudgment interest at the rate of
6% per annum on the $71,701.24 total amount (exclusive of
attorneys fees) awarded, in the amount of $41,154.67 through
March 31, 1999, with prejudgment interest accruing at the rate of
$11.79 per diem until judgment is entered, together with
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postjudgment interest on all of the above amounts, and including
the $20,000,00 attorneys fees awarded, at the legal rate
thereafter until all of the above sums are paid m

full.

From the foregoing Findings of~Fact, the Court now makes and
adopts its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The 1979 Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) is clear on

its face and unambiguous m
intent: that

its terms relating to the parties1

Defendant Smedley transfer fee title absolute to the

Glauser Storage Sheds Property to Glauser Construction

m

exchange for the Glausers' conveyance of fee title to the Melame
Acres Property.

The Warranty Deed from the

Smedleys no Glauser

Construction further evidences the intent that the conveyance of
the Glauser Storage Sheds Property to Glauser Construction was an
outright conveyance cf fee title absolute.
2.

Plaintiff Glauser Storage, L.L.C., and the individual

Plaintiffs as members of Glauser Storage, are awarded a judgment
and decree quieting title in and to the Glauser Storage Sheds
Property more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point North 0O08'30n East 1266 57 feet
and North 89034'30" West 1368.86 feet from the South
East corner of Section 4; Township 4 North, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Meridian; thence South 89O0i'50M West
108.05 feet; thence South 0O36'02M East 206.17 f eet •
thence North 89O43'07" East 105.36 feet; thence North
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0O08!30n East 207.47 feet to the point of beginning.
Together with the R/WS described in 653-391
Beginning at a point 1220.86 feet North 89O34,30M West
along Section line and 596 feet North 0O08'30n East
parallel to the East line of Section 4 from the South
East corner of Section 4;"Township 4 North Range 1
West, Salt Lake Meridian; running thence North
0O08130" East 327 feet; thence North 89034' 30" West
148 feet; thence South 0O08'30" West 327 feet; thence
South 89034'30" East 148 feet to the point of
beginning. Together with R/W described in 653-391.
3.

Defendant Smedley has no interest in the Glauser Storage

Shed3 Property described in paragraph 2 above; his filing for
record the Notice of Interest against the Glauser Storage Sheds
Property is in breach of the 1979 Agreement and is null and void
and of no force or effect; and the Court should enter a judgment
and decree quieting title in the above-described property in and
to the Plaintiff, Glauser Storage, as against the Defendant
Smedley and ail others claiming by, through, or under. Defendant
Smedley,
4.

Plaintiffs are awarded judgment against Defendant

Smedley in the amount of $24,000.00 for his failure to pay to Mel
and Kathy Glauser the annual sum of $6,000.00 for travel expenses
for the years 1994 through 1987 in breach of the 1979 Agreement.
5.

Plaintiffs are awarded judgment against Defendant

Smedley in the amount of $20,703.3 8 for property taxes owed on
the Glauser Storage Sheds Property during the years 1984 through
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1990 for which Defendant Smedley was obligated but failed to pay
in breach of the 1979 Agreement, and which property taxes were
paid by the Glausers.
6. Plaintiffs are awarded judgment against Defendant Smedley
m

the amount of $16,000.00 for roof repairs paid for by

Plaintiffs on the Glauser Storage Sheds Property in January and
February 1995 which are attributable to the roofs being in a
state of disrepair prior to the Glauser Storage Sheds Property
being turned over to Plaintiffs, and for which repairs Defendant
Smedley was obligated, but failed, to pay, in breach of the 1979
Agreement.
7. Plaintiffs are awarded judgment against Defendant Smedley
in the amount of $2,037.00 for asphalt repairs paid for by
Plaintiffs on the Glauser Storage Sheds Property m

July 1995,

which are attributable to the asphalt being in a state of
disrepair prior to the Glauser Storage Sheds Property being
turned over to Plaintiffs, and for which repairs Defendant
Smedley was obligated, but failed, to pay, in breach of the 1979
Agreement.
8.

Plaintiffs* remaining claims for repair and maintenance

are cenied for lack of proof that those items were the result of
Smedley's failure to maintain the property with respect to those
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items m

a state of repair during the time for which he was

responsible.
9.

Defendant Smedley failed to fund the $300,000.00 escrow

to secure and guarantee his payment ~and performance of his other
obligations under the 1979 Agreement, which constituted a breach
thereof. Consequently, the Parties orally modified the 1979
Agreement with respect to the provision of security for Glauser,
and Smedley gave Glauser a Mortgage to certain real property
located m
10.

Salmon, Lemhi County, Idaho.
In connection with Smedley"s conveyance of the Salmon,

Idaho Property to Glauser, Defendant Smedley promised to pay the
property taxes, but he has failed to make those tax payments from
and after tne Tax Year 1983 to the present in oreacn of his
agreement, requiring the Glausers to make said payments, m

the

stipulated amount of $5,960.86.
11.
Smedley m

Plaintiffs are awarded ]udgment against Defendant
the amount of $8,960.86 for his failure to pay

property taxes on the Salmon, Idaho Property.
12.

In or about March 13, 1980, Smedley gave to Plaintiffs*

predecessor m

interest, Melvm D. Glauser, a Warranty Deed,

which was recorded on March 13, 1980, as document number 151496
in the Lemhi County Recorder's Office, State of Idaho, to a
portion of the property originally conveyed by Mortgage, and,
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consequently, the Plaintiffs are now the record title owners of
approximately 188 acres referred to as the Glauser Idaho
Property, which is more particularly described as follows:
The SMSKSEMSEK; SHSHSWHSEtf; SMSHSEtfSWK and the
SKS^SW^SWtf in Section 1, Township 21 N., Ranqe 21 E. ,
Boise Meridian, ALSO the S^S^SEKSE1/; SMSXSWViSEfc;
SXSXSEViSWA in Section 2, Township 21 N., Range 21 E.,
Boise Meridian, ALSO a parcel of land located in the
NE^XNWK and the NWKNEK of Section 11, Township 21 N.,
Range 21 E., Boise Meridian, described as follows:
Beginning at the Northwest corner of the NEKNW1/ of said
section, run thence South, 544 f.eet; thence East, 820
feet; thence North, 60 feet; thence East, 100 feet;
thence South, 60 feet; thence East 1720 feet; thence
North, 544 feet; thence West, 2640 feet to the POINT OF
BEGINNING,
ALSO: The NEMNE^ and the NKNKSEViNEK in section 11,
Township 21 N., Range 21 E., Boise Meridian, and ALSO
the NWtfNWK; NJJNMSWVCNWH, NHNHSEtfNWK and the NElXNWK in
section 12, Township 21 N., Range 21 E., Boise
Meridian, all located in Lemhi County, State of Idaho.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM: A part of the Northwest Quarter of
Section 12, Township 21 N. Range 21 E., Boise Meridian:
Beginning at the Northeast corner of said Quarter
Section, and running thence South, 1628.0 feet; thence
West, 1070.27 feet; thence North, 1628.0 feet; thence
East, 1070.27 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING...
AND FURTHER EXCEPTING THEREFROM: A part of the SW1/ of
Section 1 and a part of the SE# of Section 2, Township
21 North, Range 21 East, Boise Meridian: Beginning at
the SW corner of said Section 1; thence East 1401.11
feet; thence North 3 degrees West 355 feet; thence West
3,036.11 feet; thence South 355 feet more or less to
the South Section Line of said Section 2; thence East
1,635 feet more or less to the Point of Beginning
13.

The Court concludes, however, that the parties intended

the Glauser Idaho Property to be used as security for Defendant
Smedley's obligations under the 1979 Agreement, and the
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conveyance by Warranty Deed was given as a security interest
rather than as an outright conveyance and will be treated as an
Equitable Mortgage.
14.

Because the Warranty Deed"was given as security, the

Court lacks jurisdiction to deal with the Glauser Idaho Property
described in paragraph 12 above.

It appears to the Court that

the appropriate remedy for the Plaintiffs will be to file an
action in Lemhi County, Idaho, to foreclose their Warranty Deed
as an Equitable Mortgage or security interest in that property.
15.

Plaintiffs are entitled to foreclose their interest in

the Glauser Idaho Property in the -judgment amounts set forth
herein, together with prejudgment and postjudgment interest,
reasonable attorneys* fees, expenses, and costs, because of
Smedley1s breaches of his obligations under the 1979 Agreement,
but they must do so in Idaho.
16.

The conveyance by Smedley to Glauser Construction Co.

of Lots 8 and 10 in Smedley Estates Subdivision Phase 2 Block 3,
Lemhi County, Idaho, shall be treated in the same manner as the
Glauser Idaho Property, that is, as an equitable mortgage
securing

Smedleyls obligations to Glauser which the Court has

found to be in default, as set forth above. Thus, as with the
Glauser Idaho Property, Plaintiffs are entitled to foreclose
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their interest in Lots 8 and 10 in the appropriate Court having
jurisdiction over real property in Lemhi County, Idaho.
17.

Defendant Smedley failed to show by sufficient or

reliable evidence that he transferred the lots in Smedley Estates
and Cottonwood unit number 3 in consideration for the property
taxes owed on the Idaho property.

There is no evidence except

Smedley1s testimony of oral agreements during Mel Glauser's
lifetime; Mel Glauser and Smedley had ongoing business
relationships for many, many years; and there is no way to link
these particular transactions, but for the oral agreement claimed
by Smedley.
18.

The Court further concludes that Smedley's evidence

concerning what value, if any, might be ascribed to these lots,
is unreliable and inconclusive.
19.

Defendant Smedley's testimony that he performed

$56,482.00 worth of work in 1988 pursuant to an alleged oral
agreement in satisfaction of his obligations, defaults, and
delinquencies, is inadmissible under Rules 403 and 601 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. That evidence is based on hearsay, the
probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, and the evidence lacks any indicia of
trustworthiness.

That evidence is being offered to allegedly
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satisfy obligations, delinquencies, and defaults pursuant to an
madmissable oral agreement.
20.

Defendant Smedley's testimony of an alleged oral

agreement regarding the transfer of~the Cottonwood unit 3 is
inadmissible as well for the same reasons.
21.

Defendant Smedley's testimony concerning an alleged

oral agreement in 1988 and the evidence that Mr. Smedley
presented to the court concerning Defendant's Exhibit 3 8 is
inadmissible.
22.

Finally, the work Defendant Smedley alleges to have

performed m

1988 to satisfy his defaults and obligations is

barred by latches due to his unreasonable delay and lack of
diligence in failing to make any assertion or to memorialize the
same with Glauser while he was alive, and the unfair prejudice to
Plaintiffs as a result of Smedley's waiting until after the
Glausers' deaths to make this assertion.
23.

Defendant's claim to a right of offset against the

judgment amounts he owes to Glauser for the value of the acreage
Glauser conveyed to Isley is denied. Plaintiffs stipulated, and
the Court concludes, that the promised consideration received for
the conveyance to Bill Isley runs with the land and,
consequently, as a result of the Court's previous finding that
Smedley's conveyance to Glauser of the Idaho Property is an
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equitable mortgage rather than an outright conveyance, that
Smedley as well as Plaintiffs are entitled to the benefits of the
promised consideration, release of the Agricultural Lease upon
ultimate sale of the Glauser Idaho Property.
24.

Plaintiffs are awarded judgment against Defendant

Smedley in the amount of $20,000.00 for reasonable attorney's
fees and expenses pursuant to paragraph 4 of the 1979 Agreement,
inasmuch as Defendant Smedley has breached his obligations under
the 1979 Agreement, and Plaintiffs have prevailed on that part of
their cause of action that deals specifically with the 1979
Agreement, and with the Glauser Storage Sheds and Property.
25.

The judgment amounts awarded Plaintiffs as set forth

above, in the amount of $71,701.24 (exclusive of attorneys fees)
are fixed as of a particular time and the amount of the losses
can and have been calculated with mathematical certainty,
26.

Except as to the attorneys fees awarded, Plaintiffs are

awarded prejudgment interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the
$71,701.24 total amount (exclusive of attorneys fees) awarded, in
the amount of $41,154.67 through March 31, 1999, with prejudgment
interest accruing at the rate of $11.79 per diem until judgment
is entered, together with postjudgment interest on all of the
above amounts, and including the $20,000.00 attorneys fee9
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awarded, at the legal rate thereafter until all of the above sums
are paid in full.
27.

Plaintiffs are awarded their costs of this action,

DATED this

day of

., 1999.
BY THE COURT:

District Judge
FORM:
T. R/ichaki Davis
A t t q r n e y for Defendant
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